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Policy  denotes  a  course  of  action.  Agricultural  policy  refers
to actions  of  the  federal  government  affecting  the  agricultural
industry.  Policy  may  be  divided  into  two  phases:  direct  price-
income programs and general resource programs.  This discussion
deals  with one phase  of agricultural  policy; namely,  price  policy.
Consideration  is limited  to one major commodity,  wheat.
Appraisal  of policy  requires analysis  of:
1. What we have; the situation or statement of the problem.
2. What we want;  objectives or  goals.
3.  How to get what we want; means or programs.
Discussion  of  wheat  price  policy  will  be  developed  under
these  three headings.
THE  PAST
A historical review of the development  of the wheat industry
may contribute to fuller understanding  of the conditions creating
the  wheat  surplus  as  it has  existed  during  the  last  generation.
Opening  of  the  western  Mississippi  Valley  after the  Civil  War
provided  opportunity for  wheat to  be pushed westward  into  the
Great  Plains.  Expansion  of wheat  farming  in  this area  was  en-
couraged by:
1. Availability of large  areas of fertile  land.
2. The  perfection  of the binder and  improved  tillage  equip-
ment.
3.  Railroads which provided access to world markets through
the  terminals  of  Chicago,  Minneapolis,  Omaha,  and
Kansas  City.
4.  Development  of  future  trading  and  warehousing  which
provided  a continuous though not always satisfactory  mar-
ket.
5.  Introduction  of hard winter wheat  and improved  milling
practices.
1Assistant  Professors  James 0.  Bray and John H.  McCoy  assisted  in  the  prepara-
tion  of  the  information  presented  in  this  paper.  The  comments  and  conclusions  are
the  author's.
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wheat produced  as  a result of these  favorable  factors.  The  pop-
ulation  of the United  States  expanded  rapidly  during the  latter
part of the last century and the early years of the current century
as a result of immigration and a high domestic birth rate.  Manu-
facturing and industrial progress stimulated the growth of cities.
Migration of farm population to urban  areas increased  the mar-
ket  demand  for  food.  Bread  was  an  important  element  in  the
diet  of  a  growing  active  population.  European  countries  were
active buyers of United States wheat.  Dollars were available from
the principal  and interest  payments on loans made for industrial
and  commercial  development  of  America.  The  United  States
had not  as yet become  "100  percent  self sufficient."  It was nat-
ural  to  exchange  wheat  for  equipment  and  goods  from  other
countries.  Even after  Canada  and  Argentina  entered  the world
market in the early part of this century, we sold 20 to 25 percent
of  our  wheat  crop  into  the  world  market.  Annual  exports  of
wheat, including flour, were in excess of  100 million bushels prior
to  the  outbreak  of  World  War  I.  Exports  for  the period  1914
through  1922  exceeded  200  million  bushels  per  year  with  the
exception  of  1917,  a  year  of crop  failure.
This  golden  era  reached  a  climax  with  the  end  of  World
War  I. The  crop  failure  of  1917  coincided  with  the  period  of
acute demand  for food by the Allies,  and wheat prices  soared to
$3.00  per  bushel.  During the  war  a  guaranteed  price  of  $2.20
per bushel was  established.  This became  in effect  a fixed  price.
This guaranteed  and favorable  price  encouraged  the  turning  of
native sod in the semi-arid  areas in the western Great Plains into
wheat  fields  during  and  immediately  following  the  war.  The
guaranteed  price  was  withdrawn  prior  to  the  harvest  of  1920,
and during  the summer  of  that year  wheat  prices  declined  ap-
proximately  50  percent.  However,  new  land  continued  to  be
brought into production in the Great Plains.  Mechanization,  con-
sisting of the rapid introduction  of combines, tractors,  and trucks
was  an important  factor, but improved  varieties,  early  plowing,
better  tillage  practices,  and summer  fallow  also  contributed  to
lower  per bushel  cost  of  production.
After early  1920 demand factors were less favorable  to wheat
farmers.  The  export market  shrank  after  the United  States  be-
came  a creditor  nation and dollars  became  scarce  to European
26buyers.  Industrial  expansion  had progressed  rapidly  during and
after World  War  I,  and  American consumers  preferred  to buy
domestically  produced  goods.  Later,  particularly  during the de-
pression  period,  many  of  our former  customers,  especially  Ger-
many  and  Italy,  attempted  to  encourage  production  of  wheat
within their own countries by restricting imports and by guaran-
teeing  their  farmers  prices  well  above  the  free  market  price  of
wheat. Canada  and Argentina became more  aggressive  competi-
tors in the world market. Canada was an effective competitor not
only in number  of bushels  exported but  also  in terms  of quality
of wheat.
Exports were  no longer able  to take up the slack of domestic
surplus.  Per  capita  consumption  had  declined  during  World
War  I  and  continued  to  move  downward.  As  prices  declined,
agitation for solution to the surplus problem resulted in numerous
proposals of price supporting schemes. The Agricultural Market-
ing Act of 1929 created the Federal Farm Board with a revolving
fund of a half billion dollars for the purpose of stabilizing  prices
of  farm products.  However,  the onset  of  world-wide  depression
and abundant production in 1931  made these  efforts futile. After
1933  the  surplus  stocks  accumulated  during  the  early  thirties
were  removed  by  successive  crop  failures.  Acreages  remained
large, and burdensome stocks accumulated again prior to the out-
break of  World War  II. These  stocks  were  utilized  in the early
war years for livestock feed and for industrial alcohol  (Table  1).
THE  PROBLEM
The  wheat  problem  of the  United  States  is  one  of  surplus
production.  Wheat is basically a cereal crop or bread grain.  The
quantity  of  wheat  produced  averages  substantially  more  than
the domestic consumption as human food.  In several recent years,
the annual production has been almost  two and  a half times the
quantity  consumed  for  food.  Outlet  for  the  surplus  or  excess
output  is  to  be  found  only  in  the  demand  for  food  in  foreign
countries  or in secondary uses such as livestock  feed or industrial
uses  in the United  States.
Production  of wheat fluctuates widely  from year  to year as  a
result  of  weather  influences  and  variations  in  acreage  seeded.
Seeded  acreage for the major wheat producing  regions  is shown
in Table  2. In  1933  United  States  production  was  552  million
27bushels.  In  1947  the crop  was  1,359  million bushels  or  two  and
a half times  the  1933  production  (Table  3).
The demand for wheat is highly inelastic.  Under free market
conditions  a  small increase  in quantity  produced  or  offered  for
sale causes a substantial decline in price. Conversely,  a temporary
scarcity  resulting  from crop failure  causes  sharp  price  increases.
Such  price  increases,  even  though  of  relatively  short  duration,
may stimulate income expectations among farmers which are not
justified  on  the basis  of  long-run  demand  and  supply  relation-
ships.  Farmers'  expectations,  or  hopes for  prosperity,  are  stimu-
lated  also  by  periodic  emergency  conditions,  such  as  in the  last
ten  years  when  outlets  at  satisfactory  prices  were  provided  for
the output from expanded  acreages.  This,  along with the varia-
tions in yield resulting  from weather  influences,  has complicated
the problem of adjusting  resources devoted  to wheat production,
either in line with domestic requirements  or in line with domestic
requirements  plus normal  or subsidized  exports.
The conditions  under which wheat  is  produced  and  the na-
ture of the  demand  curve result in wide variations  in income  to
wheat farmers,  individually and by regions.  Basically the request
of  wheat  farmers  for  assistance  from  the  federal  government
arises from the desire for or need of protection from drastic varia-
tions  in  income.  Since  income  to  individual  farmers  is  highly
variable,  the  stakes  or rewards  are large for those who  have  re-
serves  or  who  can  "weather"  adversity  during  periods  of  low
yields and  low prices. This explains  the large individual incomes
in the specialized  wheat regions  during the last ten years.  It also
makes  the adjustment of resources  devoted  to wheat production
difficult.  Wheat farmers  who lived  through  the thirties  to enjoy
the rewards of the forties  may be  reluctant  to reduce acreage  by
30 or 40  percent.  Capitalization  of income  of the last  ten  years
into  land  prices  and  increased  investment  in equipment  add  to
the complexity of the problem.
Use of Resources-The  Supply Problem
The wheat problem  is primarily one of resource  allocation on
the  supply  side  and  inelasticity  of demand  on  the income  side.
These  two phases  of the  problem will  be  examined  in more  de-
tail.  Allocation  of  resources  devoted  to  wheat  production  is
influenced  by  production  uncertainty,  price  uncertainty,  tech-
28nological  change,  the  competitive  situation  prevailing  in  the
production  and  marketing of wheat,  and the fluctuations  in the
size of reserve stocks  or carry-over from year to year.
Production uncertainty  is a major risk for most wheat  farm-
ers,  especially  in the  Great  Plains  states.  The  farmer  has  little
assurance  about  his  crop  until  the  combine  has  made  the  first
round.  Unlike  the manufacturer  he cannot  decide  to  produce  a
given number  of units.  Total wheat  production  is  a function  of
yield  and acreage  seeded.  Yield  reflects  the  influence  of  a num-
ber  of  factors,  including  natural  phenomena  (weather,  insects,
and  disease)  over  which the  farmer has  little control,  and pro-
duction  practices  (fallow,  tillage,  fertilizer,  and  variety)  over
which  he  has  control.  Natural  phenomena  cause  wide  fluctua-
tions  in  abandonment  (Tables  4  and  5),  which  is  reflected  in
yield  per seeded acre.  Acreage seeded  is influenced by a number
of factors,  such as price  expectation  and anticipation  for normal
or  above  average  yields  for  the  future.  Price  expectations  are
assumed  to  be  related  to  past  prices.  In recent  years  they  have
been influenced  by  announced  levels  of price  supports.  In  areas
where  moisture  is the limiting factor,  rainfall  or soil moisture  at
seeding  time affects  anticipation  or hope for normal  yields.
In only one year  prior to  1943  did we produce  more  than  a
billion  bushels  of  wheat.  In  only  one  year  since  1943  have  we
failed  to produce  a  billion  bushels,  and  in that  year  the  billion
bushel mark was missed by only  19  million bushels.  For the four
years of  1933,  1934,  1935,  and  1936 the average total production
in the United States was 584 million bushels, on a seeded acreage
of  69  million  acres.  The  largest  production  in  this  period  was
630  million bushels  produced from  74 million seeded  acres. The
average  yield for  the four years was  slightly less than 8.5  bushels
per  seeded acre.  If we  contrast  these years  with the four "best"
years, we find the average  annual production for the period  1945
through  1948  was  1,228  million  bushels  or more  than twice  as
large as  the output for the four years  of small crops.  Seedings  in
these  years  of large  crops  averaged  about  74  million  acres  and
the yield  per  seeded  acre  was  16.5  bushels.  The  largest  output
was  1,358 million bushels in 1947  from 78.3  million acres  seeded.
Acreage  seeded  to wheat  has  ranged  from  53  million  acres
for  the  1942  crop  to  84  million acres  for the  1949  crop.  Plant-
ings  for the  1953  crop were  78.6  million  acres.  On  the basis  of
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same  for  all  regions  since  1940.  Prior  to  that  differences  were
evident.
In  recent  years  variations  in seeding  of  hard  winter  wheat
have  ranged  from  23.2  million  acres  for  the  1942  crop  to  39.3
million  acres  planted  for  the  1949  crop.  Seedings  in the  fall  of
1952 were 34.3  million acres. Seeding of spring wheat has varied
from  14.7 million to 22.7  million acres with current seedings  esti-
mated  at  21.5  millions.  Acreages  of  soft wheat  varied  from  8.2
million to  11.1  million acres. Plantings for the current season are
10.6 million acres. The Pacific Northwest has increased  plantings
from  3.5 million acres  in  1942  to 6 million acres  for  the current
season  (Table  2).
Farmer  decision in regard  to  acreage  to be  seeded  is an  im-
portant factor in the wheat problem.  It is difficult to demonstrate
statistically  the  factors  entering  into  farmers'  decisions.  Past
prices  and  expectation  of prices  for the next season  are  assumed
to be  major factors  in the decision-making  process.  However,  if
acreage  seeded is plotted with price the preceding season, for  the
period  1910  to  date,  evidence  of  association  is  not  conclusive.
There was an upward trend of acreage in the Great Plains states
during  the  twenties  as  mechanization  progressed,  and  acreages
remained  large in spite  of low prices and  low  yields  during the
depression  period.  However,  if  the  period  since  the  depression
is analyzed, there does appear to be consistent association between
acreage  seeded  and  price  (deflated)  for  the preceding  season.2
Because  of the  importance  of this question to the wheat sur-
plus  problem,  study  was  given  to  the  degree  of  association  for
the period  1936  to  1951.  Correlation  analyses  of  acreage  seeded
and  the  price  the  preceding  season  were  made  by  regions  for
this  period  (Table  6).  The  coefficient  of  correlation  for  these
areas was  highly significant  for  the hard  winter wheat  area  and
the Pacific  Northwest,  and significant for the spring  wheat area.
The  correlation  of  acreage  seeded  and  price  the  preceding  sea-
son  (deflated)  is highest in the hard  red winter wheat area.  For
2It  is  recognized  that  the  period  considered  was  one  of  generally  rising  prices.
While it appears  that rising prices were accompanied  by increasing  acreage,  it does not
necessarily  follow  that declines  in  prices  will  be  associated  with  similar  decreases  in
acreage  in the  short run.  High fixed  costs incurred  in  a period  of expansion,  and  pos-
sibly  other  considerations,  may  tend  to  induce  farmers  to  maintain  production  in
periods  of  declining  prices.
30the period  1936  to date,  a  10  cent  change  in the deflated  price
of wheat is associated  with  a change in  plantings of  1.7  million
acres  (equals  5.4  percent  of  average  acreage).  In  the  Pacific
Northwest,  the relationship  is about the  same  as in the hard  red
winter wheat area. For the period  1936 to date, a  10 cent change
in the  deflated  price  appears  to be  associated  with  a  change  in
plantings of 280  thousand  acres,  or 5.7  percent  of  average  acre-
age.  Percentage-wise  the  response  is  about the  same in both  re-
gions.  In the spring wheat  area the degree  of relationship  is  less
pronounced,  and  the amount  of change  is  less than in either the
hard  winter  wheat  area  or  the  Pacific  Northwest.  There  are
two  periods  of acreage  increases-1936,  1937,  and  1938;  and
1949  and  1951-which were  not associated  with  prices the pre-
ceding  season.  In the  soft  red winter  wheat  area  there  appears
to  be  little  relationship  between  seeded  acreage  and  price  the
preceding year for the period 1936-51  as a whole. However,  from
1942 to 1951  the data indicate that higher prices were  associated
with increases in acreage.
Plantings  of  wheat  are  influenced  also  by  price  for  longer
periods than the preceding  season.  The relationship  of the price
(deflated)  for  the second  season preceding  is  similar  to  that of
the preceding  season.  This  suggests  that  a  prolonged  period  of
favorable prices tends to have an accumulative  influence  on acre-
age  planted.
In Ford County, Kansas, a  10 cent change in price (deflated)
the preceding season  appears  to be  associated  with  a change  in
acreage  seeded  of  17,230  acres  or  4.6  percent  of  the  average
acreage.3 However,  in this county acreages  planted for  the  1936,
1937,  and  1938  crops increased  more than would  have been  ex-
pected  on the basis of  price the  preceding  season.  This may  be
explained  in part by previous  crop failures  and the urgent need
for cash income  during that period.  Comparable  data were  not
available  for a similar period for a county in the soft wheat area.
Annual  yield  is one of the  two major factors determining  in-
come of wheat farmers.  Yields and selling  price  determine  gross
income.  Net income,  of course,  is influenced  by operating  costs.
3In  Ford  County  r  =  +.578,  which  is  significant.  The  coefficient  of  regression
was  +1.723.  This  means  that  a  change  in  price  of  one  cent  was  associated  with  a
change,  in  the  same  direction,  of  1.723  thousand  seeded  acres.  Therefore,  a  change
in price  of  10 cents was  associated  with  a change  of  17,230  seeded  acres.  A  change  of
17,230  acres  is  4.6  percent  of  the  average  acreage  seeded  to  wheat.
31To  a  large  degree,  operating  costs  other  than  harvesting  costs
are incurred even though yields are zero.  The variability of yield,
especially  in the Great  Plains  area  is large.  Complete  crop  fail-
ure, or  zero yields  are not uncommon.  During  the drouth  of  the
thirties many areas had crop failures for three years in succession.
The  hard  winter  wheat  area  has  lower  average  yields  than
the other  regions  and  larger  variations  in yield.  Table  7 shows
the mean and standard deviation of yield for the four  regions for
the period  1938  to  1953.
Abandonment  is  a  factor  of  uncertainty  affecting  yield  per
seeded  acre.  Abandonment  is  large  and  highly  variable  in  the
hard  winter wheat  area.  In  this area  there  have  been  only  two
years  since  1919  when  abandonment  was  less  than  5  percent,
and  11  years  when  abandonment  exceeded  20  percent  (Tables
4 and 5).  There have been three years when more than one-third
of  the  seeded  acreage  was  not  harvested.  In  the  spring  wheat
area,  abandonment  generally  has  been  less  than  10  percent,
though there have  been  five  years when  abandonment  exceeded
20 percent.  Abandonment  has been slightly higher in the Pacific
Northwest.  In the soft wheat area  abandonment  generally  is  less
than  10 percent  and about one-third  of the time it has been less
than 5 percent.  However,  there was one year,  1928,  when aban-
donment was 44 percent in this region due to winterkilling.
Barber 4 calculated average yields and coefficients of variation
of yield  by counties  in  the  United  States for  the period  1926  to
1948.  The  coefficients  of variation  of yield  for  Indiana  counties
with  one exception  were  in  a range  of 23  to  35.5  In Kansas,  19
counties had coefficients  of variation  ranging from 50 to  75,  and
17 counties  had coefficients  in excess  of  74.  Wallace  County had
a  coefficient  of variation  of yield  of 93.  These  data  indicate  the
variability  of yield  and consequently  the variability of income  in
4E.  Lloyd  Barber,  "Variability  of  Wheat  Yields  by  Counties,  in  the  United
States,"  U.  S.  Department  of Agriculture,  Bureau of  Agricultural  Economics,  Septem-
ber  1951  (mimeo).
5 The  coefficient  of variation  is  a  means  of indicating  the  degree  of  variability  in
a  series  of data.  It  expresses  the standard  deviation  of the  annual-yield  series  as a  per-
centage  of  the arithmetic average  of the series.  It  may  be  used to compare  the  relative
yield  variability  among  counties  in  which  the  average  yields  are  quite  different  and
provides  also  an  indication  of  the  way  in  which  yearly  yields  are  distributed  about
their  average.
Ford County  (Kansas)  has  a  coefficient  of variation  of  70  percent.  This  is  inter-
preted  to  mean  that  two-thrids  of  the  annual  yields  would  fall  within  a  range  of
(100  - 70)  x  10.5  (the  average  yield)  and  (100  +  70)  x  10.5,  or within  the range
3.15 bushels  to  17.85  bushels  per  acre.
32areas of the hard winter wheat area, where  risk and uncertainty
are great.
Price  uncertainty  is  another  risk  over  which  farmers  indi-
vidually  have  little  or  no  control.  Fluctuations  in  wheat  prices
are  sudden  and substantial.  Ironically,  for  the last twenty  years
low prices  appear  to have  been  associated  with  low  yields,  and
high prices  with high yields. The period  1934  through  1936  was
a  period  of  low  yields  in  the  Great  Plains  area.  During  this
twenty-year  period prices  were highest  in 1947,  a year of record
production.  In that  year  production  was  more  than  two  and  a
half times the average production  of  1934,  1935,  and  1936.  The
price  was  four times as high.
Variability of production  and inelastic demand  cause  drastic
fluctuations  in wheat  prices  from season  to  season.  Immediately
prior to World War  I the  season's  average farm  price  of wheat
ranged from 80 cents  to one dollar. During and immediately fol-
lowing World War  I, the farm price exceeded  or was near $2.00
per  bushel.  For  the  1922  and  1923  seasons,  the  farm  price  was
92 cents and 96 cents. For the next four seasons, it averaged from
$1.20 to $1.40.  For the  1931  and  1932 seasons,  the average farm
price was  38 cents. After  three crop  failures in the Great  Plains
area,  the season's  average  price  reached  $1.02  in  1936,  but de-
clined to 55 cents in  1938. For the last seven seasons, the average
farm price has been near or exceeded  $2.00 per bushel. The high-
est  average  was  for  the  season  of  1947  with  a  price  of  $2.29.
During part of the recent  period,  the price  has been held  up by
the loan,  but in other  periods,  as in  1947  and  1948,  export  de-
mand  pushed  prices  above  support  levels.
In  addition  to  substantial  fluctuations  in  average  seasonal
prices, wheat prices are subject to sudden and  sharp fluctuations
within  seasons.  Frequently  these  fluctuations,  in  farmers'  minds
at least,  cannot  be associated  with  identifiable  causes,  i.e.,  they
cannot be  explained  by changes  in the supply or demand  situa-
tion.  For example,  wheat  prices advanced  sharply  when World
War II  began  in September  1939,  yet  when the war  spread  as
Germany  moved  into  the  low  countries  in  May  1940,  wheat
prices  declined  sharply.  There  was  no  significant  change  in  the
actual supply situation,  but psychological  appraisals of the situa-
tion  changed  sharply.  Prior  to  the  bank  holiday  cash  wheat
prices at Kansas City were less  than 50 cents.  On July  19,  1933,
33No.  2 hard  wheat at Kansas  City was  $1.18. Five days  later,  the
top  price  was  89.5  cents.  For  long  periods  farmers  have  been
unhappy  about having their  major  source  of  income  influenced
in  this manner.
Examination  of variation  in  annual  income  from wheat  by
regions,  by  states,  or by  smaller  areas  indicates  the  magnitude
of the income problem  to wheat farmers.  Table  8  shows  the  an-
nual  income  from wheat  in the  hard  red  winter  wheat  region,
deflated  by  an  index  of  prices  farmers  pay  (including  interest,
taxes, and wages)  for the period  1920  to  1952 inclusive.  Table 9
shows similar information for  three major soft red winter wheat
producing states  (i.e.,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois)  and the  soft
red winter wheat region  as  a whole.
Technological  changes  during  the  last  generation  have  had
significant  influences  on  the quantity  of wheat  produced.  Tech-
nological  advances  have  lowered  unit  costs  of  production.  In
all  of  the major  wheat  producing  areas  mechanical  power  has
replaced  horse  power  and  horse  drawn  equipment.  The  use  of
tractors,  combines,  and  trucks is universal.  This has  reduced  per
bushel costs, increased  the scale  of operation,  and has  made pos-
sible  tillage  practices  which  previously  were  not  feasible.  Sum-
mer  fallow,  improved  varieties,  and  fertilizer  have  increased
yields  and  encouraged  the  expansion  of acreage  in  areas  previ-
ously beyond  the margin  of cultivation.
The  influence  of  technological  changes  are  summarized  by
Johnson in  data he  presented  on  trends  of  man-hours  per  acre,
yield,  and  man-hours  per  100  bushels  produced 6 (Table  10).
These data show that in the  1945-48  period, man-hours  of labor
per  100  bushels  were  one-third  those  required  in  the  1910-14
period.  The  effects  of  the  higher  efficiency  are  a  factor  in  the
wheat  surplus  problem.  Changes  of this kind  are not  adequately
reflected  in  the  formula  used  for  calculating  parity  prices  for
wheat.
The  competitive  situation  under  which  wheat  is  produced
and marketed  is  a part of the wheat  surplus  problem.  The  indi-
vidual  producer cannot  gain by restricting  output  as  can  manu-
6Sherman  E.  Johnson,  "Changes  in  American  Farming,"  U.  S.  Department  of
Agriculture,  Miscellaneous  Publication  No.  707,  December  1949.
34facturers  operating  under  conditions  of  imperfect  competition.
Wheat  farmers  are motivated  to increase output until  estimated
per bushel cost of production equals the anticipated selling price.
The production  and  sale of wheat  from the viewpoint  of the
individual  farmer  approaches  the  conditions  characterized  as
pure competition.  The  individual  wheat farmer  has  a  perfectly
elastic  demand  for  his output.  His  demand curve  is  horizontal.
With only minor exceptions his product is undifferentiated.  Indi-
vidually he has no influence  on price, regardless of quantity sold,
and no bargaining power.  He accepts the price  and terms of sale
established by others. Data in Table 11  indicate the wide fluctua-
tions in prices experienced  by farmers.  By collective  or coopera-
tive  action  farmers  have  influenced  handling  margins  and  con-
ditions of sale  at the  local shipping point. Regional  cooperatives
have  influenced  handling,  warehousing,  and  sale  of  cash  grain
in terminal markets and  have made  substantial savings  to farm-
ers, but their contribution  to the solution  of the total problem is
minor.
Demand-The  Income  Problem
Turning to the demand for wheat we find two types of outlet
influence  disappearance  or  utilization  of  wheat  in  the  United
States:  the consumption of wheat as human food, and the utiliza-
tion for secondary  or nonfood  uses.  Two facts  about the  utiliza-
tion of wheat stand out above all others:  the extreme stability in
the quantity used  as human food and the wide variations  in the
quantity taken for nonfood  uses and  exports.
The quantity  of  wheat  processed  annually  for  human  food
during the last twenty years has been slightly  less than 500  mil-
lion bushels. The smallest quantity used annually for human food
was 473 million bushels in 1941  and the largest quantity was 500
million  bushels  in  1943.  In the  period  since  the  end  of  World
War  II the annual  variation  in  the quantity  of  wheat  used  for
human food in the United  States has fluctuated  within  a range
of  1 percent.  Prior to  World War  I  per capita  consumption  of
wheat as flour exceeded  200 pounds annually  (Table  12).  Dur-
ing and immediately  after World War  I annual per capita  con-
sumption declined sharply and remained  at a level of about  175
pounds  during  the  twenties.  Further  declines  occurred  during
the early years of the depression.  During most of the thirties and
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ranged  from  158 to  162  pounds.  Further declines  occurred  after
World War II and the recent annual average has been about  135
pounds.  The  decrease in per capita  consumption  has  been offset
approximately  by  increases  in  population,  which  explains  the
highly stable  total consumption  of wheat  as  food  (Table  13).
The quantity used for industrial needs,  feed for livestock,  and
exports fluctuates widely.  Prior to the beginning of World War II
the quantity of wheat used for livestock  feed averaged  about  100
million bushels  annually.  With  a scarcity  of corn and other feed
grains  and  the  difficulty  of obtaining  supplies,  the  use  of wheat
for  livestock  feed  increased  sharply  in  1942  and  1943.  During
World  War  II the  annual  use  of wheat  for livestock  feed  aver-
aged  approximately  400 million  bushels  and  in  one  year,  1943,
exceeded  500 million bushels.  This quantity  was larger  than the
quantity used for food.  Use of wheat  for the manufacture  of in-
dustrial  alcohol  was large  during  World  War  II.  In  1943  more
than 100 million bushels were used for this purpose. Exports from
the United  States in the  last twenty years have  ranged  from 4.5
million bushels  in  1935  to 470 million  bushels  in  1951.
The  wide  fluctuations  in exports  and livestock  feed  have  re-
sulted  in  large  fluctuations  in  the  total  disappearance  in  the
United  States  in spite  of the  highly  stable  use  for  human  food.
Total  disappearance  in  the  last  twenty  years  has  ranged  from
668 million bushels in 1935 to 1,288 million bushels in 1945. With
a  single  exception,  1949,  total  disappearance  of  wheat  has  ex-
ceeded  a  billion  bushels  in each  season  since  1943.
Henry  Schultz 7 developed  a technique  for measuring  the de-
mand  for wheat in the United States.  His most  reliable  estimate
is for the period  1921-34.  His estimate  of elasticity of demand  is
- .2143. This means that a 1 percent increase in quantity would
be accompanied  by approximately  a 5  percent  decrease  in price.
This highly inelastic  demand for wheat suggests that schemes
for expanding outlets  for wheat by  increasing  human consump-
tion  are unrealistic.  Wheat  producers  have  often  held  the  hope
that  advertising  might  expand  the  outlets  for  wheat,  as  it  has
done for  many manufactured  foods and some  special  crops such
7 The  Theory and Measurement of Demand, University of  Chicago  Press,  1938.
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Level of personal income has relatively  little, if any, effect on per
capita consumption.  In fact there is some  evidence  that per cap-
ita  consumption  of  wheat  declines  as  level  of income  and  level
of  living  improve.  The  availability  of  other  foods  and  the  in-
creased consumption of fresh fruits, vegetables,  and luxury foods
as income  increases  apparently have  limited the per capita  con-
sumption  of cereals,  especially  wheat.
The rapid shifts in utilization resulting in temporary demand
for wheat for secondary uses adds to the complexity of the wheat
income  problem.  Concern  over  the wheat  surplus  problem  after
World War I arose from the fact that  production  was expanded
during  and  immediately  after  World  War  I in  response  to  the
abnormal  demand  arising  from military  and postwar  needs  for
food.  The  disappearance  of this demand  and the decline  of  the
export  demand  in the  thirties  were  responsible  for continuation
of  the  wheat  surplus  problem.  Similar  expansion  in  nonfood
demands occurred  during World  War II as  a result  of efforts  to
expand  livestock  production.  This  demand  was  replaced  later
by the need  for food  for relief  in Europe.  This  was  followed by
subsidized  exports with  emphasis  upon  the use of  wheat for  ob-
taining the cooperation  of various  areas  of the world.
Wheat  is an  excellent livestock  feed and can  be  readily  sub-
stituted for other grains in the rations for many kinds of livestock.
Outlets might be found for substantial quantities of wheat as feed
for livestock  in the United  States if the level  of livestock produc-
tion is expanded as population increases and per capita consump-
tion  of meat  and  livestock products  is  maintained.  However,  to
be competitive  in price with other feed  grains, wheat  apparently
would need  to be priced  substantially below  the current level  of
90 percent  of parity.  Data on cost of production  in the low-cost
areas  of the Great  Plains  (Table  14)  indicate  that wheat  might
be priced competitively  with feed grains and still yield a reason-
able  return to labor and investment  in these areas.
Variations  in  production,  such  as  occurred  in  the forties  as
contrasted  to the thirties,  and extreme variations  in the nonfood
uses  and exports  of wheat  have  resulted in  alternate  periods  of
scarcity  and  abundance  of  stocks.  A  carry-over  of  nearly  400
million bushels  was on hand July  1, 1933.  By  1936  we were im-
porting wheat, and at the end of that  season carry-over  reached
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stocks exceeded  600  million bushels.  This was  a valuable  reserve
for the war  emergency,  but it was  soon used up and  by  1947,  in
spite of record  crops, we were  short of wheat in relation  to need
for food  relief overseas.  Now we  have near record  reserve  stocks
again.  These  facts  indicate  the fluctuating  production  and  util-
ization  of wheat.  They should  provide the  basis for  the  develop-
ment  of  a  consistent,  well-planned,  long-range  program  of  re-
serve  stocks  to  accompany  and  undergird  price  policy  relating
to wheat.
GOALS  OF  WHEAT  PRICE  POLICY
Goals  are the criteria  or standards against which  actions im-
plementing policy may be appraised.  It is not feasible  to evaluate
or  appraise  programs  except  in  terms  of  the  goals  which  such
programs  are set up to achieve.  It is not the economist's  function
to establish goals of price policy, but rather to determine whether
or not given actions will achieve the goals which have been estab-
lished.
Goals of General  Economic  Policy
Price  policy is  one phase  of agricultural  policy,  and agricul-
tural  policy  is  only  one  part  of  general  economic  policy.  How-
ever,  it  is  essential  to evaluate  specific  price  programs  in  terms
of the goals of general economic  policy. Some of the goals of gen-
eral economic policy which appear to be widely desired are:
1. Consumer sovereignty.  This means  that consumers  should
be  free  to  express  their  preferences  through  a  system  of
relative  prices.
2.  Freedom of resource  ownership  and use.  Private property
and  individual  freedom  to assume  risk and  to  make  pro-
duction decisions are basic  institutions of our economy.
3.  Economic  progress.  This  refers  to  an increase  in real  per
capita  income  through  time,  arising  from  technological
advances  and  changing  consumption  habits.
4.  High-level  production  and  employment.
5.  Expanded world  trade.  The belief is that trade will foster
economic  progress  in  underdeveloped  areas  while  allow-
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home and abroad.
6.  Efficient  use  of resources.  This  ideal  involves the greatest
degree  of  consumer satisfaction  consistent  with the  exist-
ing supply of resources  and the state of technology.
7.  Equitable  distribution of income.
8.  Economic security. This idea refers to expectations regard-
ing future  economic  welfare.
It is  recognized  that there  is conflict  or inconsistency  among
these goals. For example, consumer sovereignty at times may con-
flict  with  the  goal  of  high-level  production  and  employment.
Likewise,  freedom  of resource use  may not promote full produc-
tion  and  employment.  The  determination  of  priorities  in  cases
of conflicting  goals  is  achieved  by political  processes.  The  exist-
ence of conflicts in goals and the necessity  of determining prior-
ities tempts  the  economist  to make recommendations  which  ap-
propriately  are the sphere of those engaged  in political activities.
Specific  Goals for  Agricultural  Policy
Agricultural programs  and actions implementing  agricultural
policy need  to  be consistent with the goals  of general  economic
policy, but such  actions are  also  designed  to  achieve  certain  ob-
jectives or goals that are  desired  by persons  engaged  in agricul-
ture. It is essential  to have an understanding  of the specific goals
or objectives of agricultural policy if an attempt is made to deter-
mine  whether  given  actions  achieve  the  results  which  farmers
desire.
The  more  specific  goals which  farmers  appear  to  desire for
their industry are:
1. Maintenance  of a farming industry capable  of producing
food and fiber to provide a high level of domestic living in
peace  and  war,  and  to  export  when  profitable  and  for
some political reasons.
2. Protection  of  agricultural producers'  incomes  from:
a.  Low  prices  resulting  from  depression.
b.  Low prices resulting from large crops due to unusually
favorable  weather.
c.  Unfair foreign  competition,  i.e.,  dumping.
393.  Protection of farmers from  monopoly in:
a.  The manufacture  and sale of goods  for production  and
for  living.
b.  The  marketing of farm products.
4.  Agricultural  research  and  education  for training  agricul-
tural  scientists,  adult  leaders,  and rural  youth.
The  list,  of  course,  is  not  comprehensive.  Others  may  set
forth  other  goals  or  give  variation  of  emphasis,  but  the  above
goals  are  a  set  of  objectives  against  which  wheat  price  policy
may be appraised.
ANALYSIS  OF  ALTERNATIVE  POLICIES
It  should  be  the  function  of  extension  economists  to  assist
farm leaders  to determine  whether  or not  given  actions or  pro-
grams will achieve  the  goals or  objectives  which they  desire.  An
effective  means  of doing  this  is  to  evaluate  or  appraise  specific
programs  in  terms of  general  economic  goals  and  specific  goals
for  agriculture.  This  process  consists  of  examining  and evaluat-
ing  past  and  existing  programs  and then  comparing  them  with
possible  alternative  programs  which  might  be  adopted  in  the
future.
The  Traditional  Approach:  The Free  Market
The  traditional  approach  or means  of  achieving  economic
objectives  in  this  country  has  been  the  "free  market."  Until
World  War  I  and  also  quite  generally  until  the  depression  of
the  thirties agriculture  operated  under conditions  characteristic
of the  free  market.  While many  modifications  influencing  prices
and  other  economic  mechanisms  have  been  introduced  in  the
last twenty years,  the philosophy of the free market still prevails
quite  generally  in  agriculture.  It  is  assumed  that  farmers  still
hold  the  free  market  system  in  high  regard  even  though  they
have  asked  for many modifications  of  the  system.
The  free  market  is  one  way  to organize  economic  activity.
This  organization  is  based  on  the  belief  that land  and  capital
should  be  private  property  and  controlled  by  individuals  who
are  free  to  use  them  as they  choose.  It  also involves  the  belief
that consumers  should be free to choose among  the various prod-
ucts in the market and  buy whatever  they choose.  Thus  respon-
sibility  for setting  the pattern  of  demand  is  left  to  consumers.
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ucts in what  quantities consumers  will demand.  The main  basis
on  which  producers  can  predict  future  demand  is  past  prices.
Outlook  information  attempts  to improve  this  decision-making
process.  It is assumed  that prices  will direct resources  into  their
most  valuable  use.
It is  further assumed that  the economy will  achieve  full  em-
ployment when  organized  along the  principles  of  the  free  mar-
ket.  Another  assumption  is that  the value  of  the  total  product
will be distributed among producers in accordance  with the value
of their contribution,  i.e.,  that everyone  will get the value  of his
product  and that this  is  "just"  and  "fair."  In practice  we have
not had a free market which satisfies all these  assumptions.  Some
sectors  of  the economy have  adjusted  output  to regulate  prices.
In the short run farmers are  unable to control  output and  influ-
ence  prices.  This  puts  them  at  a  disadvantage  compared  with
industry.
Experience  has shown  that the kind of free  market we have
attained  in fact  has not brought  consistently  high  employment.
Also,  we have  not been  pleased  with the distribution  of income
resulting from  the kind  of free market we  have  experienced.  In
addition,  especially  for  wheat  farmers,  differences  between
planned production  and actual production  due to natural  causes
and  the nature  of  the  demand  for  bread  and  cereals  have  re-
sulted in year  to year price  fluctuations  which are not adequate
guides to future needs  of consumers.
For these and other reasons, we have had legislation  designed
to modify the price structure and the pattern  of income distribu-
tion in agriculture  from what the free market would  give.
The  free  market  has  many  great  merits.  It  also  has  some
shortcomings.
The Existing  Program:  Rigid  Price  Supports
at 90  Percent of Parity
The existing  farm program  consists  of a number  of separate
programs,  many  of  which  do  not  bear  directly  on  price  but
which  have  numerous  indirect  price  implications.  In  this  cate-
gory  are  agricultural  credit,  soil  conservation,  crop  insurance,
rural  electrification,  cooperative  marketing,  and  similar  pro-
grams.  In addition, the current program includes specific  actions
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phases  of the agricultural  program may be described  briefly as  a
program of price support for basic commodities, including wheat,
at  90 percent  of  parity  through  a system  of  non-recourse  loans
and purchase agreements  to producers. Accompanying  this price-
support program is provision for acreage allotments and a system
of marketing quotas  to be implemented  when approved by  two-
thirds  of  the  voting  producers.  Stocks  of  storable  commodities,
such  as wheat,  acquired under this program  are  held as  reserves
by the Commodity Credit Corporation  or utilized as determined
by  administrative  decision.  In  the  past,  stocks  of  wheat  so  ac-
cumulated  have  been  used  primarily  as  feed  for  livestock  to
increase  the  production  of  meat  and  livestock  products  during
the war emergency,  as raw material  for the production  of indus-
trial  alcohol,  for the manufacture  of synthetic rubber during the
war,  and  for  food  relief  overseas  in  the  postwar  period.  More
recently  excess stocks  have been moved into the world  market by
subsidy from  treasury  funds.
Since  the  existing  program  of  price  support  is  based  upon
parity,  a few comments concerning  the parity concept are  appro-
priate  in  appraisal  of  the  existing program.  The  term  "parity"
was  chosen to represent  prices on a "par" with other prices. The
term implies a "fair"  price. The idea of defining farm products in
terms of their fairness  is an effort  to do something  to combat all
the forces which from time to time have contributed to relatively
low farm prices.  Some of the forces which have  caused these low
prices are:
1.  General  depression.
2.  Loss  of export market.
3.  Overproduction  of farm  products.
The  idea  that  the  agricultural  producing  industry  should
receive some particular fraction of the national income is another
goal which  parity prices  were  intended to  achieve.
In terms of economic  analysis,  the function of relative  prices
is  to  guide  production  and  distribute  income.  Viewed  in  these
terms, it is unreasonable  to apply the moral  test of "fairness"  to
a  price.  It is  reasonable,  however,  to  investigate  the  causes  of
instability  and low farm  prices.  Such  investigations  reveal  that
legislated  prices  fail  to correct  the  underlying  economic  causes
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causes.  This  is  why  economists  generally  argue  that the  parity
concept  is  not an  appropriate  means  of  solving  the  problem  of
agricultural  income.
Full  parity price for any farm  product meant,  until  1950,  a
price  in dollars that  would  buy  the same amount  of goods  that
farmers  spend  their  money  for in  both production  and  family
consumption  plus  taxes  and  interest,  as  a  bushel  or  pound  of
that product bought  in  1910-14.
The  Agricultural Act of  1948  provided  that in  1950  a mod-
ernized  parity be  calculated  by  moving  the  base  period  to  the
most recent ten-year period. For  1953 the base period is  1943-52.
The effect of modernized parity was in general to raise the parity
price of  livestock and livestock  products but to lower  the parity
price of crops.  Before  the  1948  Act went  into  effect,  the Act  of
1949  was  passed.  It provided that the parity  price  of  any basic
commodity-corn,  cotton,  wheat,  peanuts,  rice,  and  tobacco-
as of any date during the four-year  period  beginning January  1,
1950, shall not be less than its parity price computed in the man-
ner used prior to the enactment  of the Agricultural Act of  1949.
In other words, the basic  commodities were to be  supported  on
the basis of the old or new parity,  whichever  was higher.  It fur-
ther provided  for "transitional  parity  prices"  for nonbasic com-
modities.  The  idea  was  to  limit  the  reduction  in  the  level  of
support  for  such  commodities  to  5  percentage  points  a  year  as
the transition from old  to new parity was made for commodities
having  lower parity prices when calculated  by the new method.
It is possible  to mention many limitations on the use of parity
as  the  mechanism  for providing  price  assurance  to  agriculture.
It is a backward-looking rather than a forward-looking  relation-
ship.  For many commodities,  but especially  for wheat,  one may
question the extent to which the economic  relationships  involved
in  parity  apply  to  the  current  situation.  Does  it  account  ade-
quately for technological  changes and desirable  shifts in produc-
tion? For wheat,  does it reflect  adequately the basic  supply and
demand relationships which underlie the wheat surplus problem?
Has use  of the parity concept aggravated  rather than alleviated
the wheat surplus  problem?  Does  the use  of parity,  even  in the
modernized form, encourage the production adjustments between
wheat  and  livestock  products  which  consumers  desire?  These
43and many  similar questions may be  raised concerning  the use  of
parity for  establishing  rigid  price  supports  for  wheat.
The  existing  program  has  given  wheat farmers  assurance  of
prices at which they may dispose of their products not only within
a given marketing season,  but it also has provided a  price bench-
mark or basis for planning  future  operations  and  the number  of
acres  to  be  planted.  Relating  supported  prices  to  a  fixed  per-
centage  of parity stabilizes prices  received  by farmers  relative  to
prices  paid for commodities  used in production  and living, but it
does not stabilize  income.  The program,  except  for  a short time
during the drouth period, has  given consumers  assurance  of ade-
quate  supplies  of  wheat  although  consumers  may  contend  that
the price  has been higher  than necessary  to call forth an output
adequate  to meet  the  needs  for human food.  The  program  has
protected  wheat  farmers  from  major  loss  of  income  resulting
from seasonal  and sharp  fluctuations  in price  arising from large
crops and  transportation  and  storage  gluts. The relatively  favor-
able level  of price  support and the assurance  of protection from
loss  have  helped  to  maintain  a high  level  of  wheat  production
during  periods  of  above  average  needs,  such  as  during  World
War  II and  in the postwar  period.
The  program  has  produced  some  results  which  are  not  in
harmony with either the general economic  goals or the economic
goals of farmers.  It has encouraged the use of land for producing
wheat when wheat already was in surplus supply.  It has  resulted
in expansion of wheat  acreages  which  are not  justified  in  terms
of the long-run supply and demand  relationships.  It has contrib-
uted to increases in land prices, especially in areas such as western
Kansas, where the cost of production in years of favorable yields
is  low  relative  to the supported  price  of  wheat.  Land  prices  in
the United  States  are  approximately  two  and a half  times  1940
prices.  In the western third of Kansas land prices are more  than
four times  as high  as in  1940.  It is  recognized  that increases  in
land  values  since  1940  were  due  largely  to  capitalization  of in-
creased  income,  which  was  a reflection  of  both  price  and yield,
and that yield during the forties  was influenced  in large part by
favorable  weather.  However,  the rigid  support  program  tended
to maintain wheat prices and thereby contributed  to higher  land
values.  In one type of farming area, in which wheat  is the major
source  of income,  land prices  were  about  $20 per acre in  1941.
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acre in this area on March  1, 1953.  In another area,  land prices
averaged $11  per acre in  1941.  Prices  in that  area averaged  $86,
per  acre  on March  1 of this  year.  These  facts are  evidence  that
a substantial  portion  of the financial  benefits of price  support  at
90 percent  of parity has accrued  to owners  of land.
The  program  has  contributed  to  additional  investment  in
machinery  and  equipment,  which  will  tend to  result  in  "excess
capacity"  for many wheat farmers if  they are required  to reduce
acreage  substantially. Wheat price  supports at 90 percent of par-
ity have been of greatest benefit  to those  owning most resources.
In  effect,  the  amount  of financial  benefit  is  tied  to the  scale  of
operations and the volume of production. Furthermore,  the finan-
cial advantage  tends  to be  largest  in  those  years  of large  crops
when  additional income  is least  needed  by wheat  farmers.
Owing  to  the  fact  that  acreage  allotments  and  marketing
quotas  have  been  imposed  for  only  relatively  short  periods  of
time,  there  has  been  relatively  little  loss of  freedom  of  decision
in  planning  production.  However,  with  the  establishment  of
acreage allotments  and with the imposition  of marketing quotas
there  will be substantial  restriction  of freedom  of  individual  de-
cision with respect to resource  use.  Resistance to this  loss of free-
dom will create many administrative  headaches  when marketing
quotas  are  imposed.  Observation  indicates  that  the  favorable
situation under which  wheat  farmers have  operated  during  the
past  ten  years  in  regard  to  guaranteed  prices  and  freedom  to
produce  a maximum amount has dulled their vision with  respect
to the "cost"  of supported  prices  in terms  of  loss of freedom  of
action.
The  system of price  supports which  has been  established  for
wheat has not resulted in output being obtained from lowest  cost
producers.  Some  estimates  of the  per  bushel  cost of  production
based on  1941-50 yields  and  1926-47  yields  for selected  areas  in
Kansas,  northern  Indiana,  and  southern  Michigan  were  made
at the Kansas Station. These calculations show an estimated cost
of  less  than  80  cents  a  bushel  in  southwestern  Kansas  through
the use  of summer  fallow  as  compared  with  costs ranging  from
$1.50  to  $1.75  in  eastern  Kansas  and  northern  Indiana.  This
indicates  wide  variations  of  costs among  the various  areas  pro-
ducing  wheat.  These  estimates  indicate  also  that  the  level  of
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call forth a volume  of wheat  production  to meet  adequately  the
domestic  needs for human food.
Supports at  90  percent  of  parity  have  held  domestic  wheat
prices  substantially  above  the  world  level  of  wheat  prices  and
above the prices specified in the International  Wheat Agreement.
Sale  under  the International  Wheat  Agreement  and  movement
of additional reserve stocks  into export have  required substantial
amounts  of  public  funds  for  disposing  of  stocks  of  wheat  not
needed  for  domestic  requirements.  More  than  one-half  billion
dollars has been paid to subsidize the exports of wheat during the
last four  years.  In  spite  of this  substantial  subsidy  excess  stocks
have continued to accumulate and on June 30 of the current year
were  559  million bushels.  This  is near  an  all-time  record.  Con-
sumers have  questioned  the program  of  rigid  price  supports  to
producers,  especially  on commodities  such as  potatoes and  eggs,
where prices  received  by farmers  make  up a substantial  portion
of the price paid by consumers.  Consumers  of bread  and cereals
have  not  been  particularly  critical  of  the  wheat  price-support
program  primarily  because  the price  which  farmers  receive  for
wheat  used in these  products  is  a  relatively  small  proportion  of
the retail price which the housewife  pays for bread  and  cereals.
Flexible  Price  Supports
The Agricultural Act of 1949 provides for a system of flexible
price supports for basic commodities. The scale of supports estab-
lished  in the Act ranges from  75  to 90 percent  of parity, varying
inversely  with changes  in total  stocks  of the commodity.
The  purpose  of a system of flexible  price supports related  to
total stocks is an attempt to adjust the support price to the inelas-
ticity  of the demand  curve,  In practical  testing  of  flexible  sup-
ports for a commodity such as wheat it is essential  to consider the
degree  to which the  scale of flexible  supports  takes into  account
the  elasticity of  the demand  curve.  The  hypothesis  to be tested
is  that  the  demand  for  wheat  in  the  domestic  market  is  more
inelastic  than  the  scheduled  demand  established  in  the  Agri-
cultural Act  of  1949  under  the  flexible  price-support  provision.
If  estimates  of  these  two  schedules  could  be  developed,  one
should  be able  to make  some estimate  of  the quantity  of wheat
which would go into storage for crops of various sizes correspond-
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Reference has already been made to the demand curve developed
by Henry Schultz  for wheat  which has  a coefficient  of elasticity
of demand  of -. 2143.
Using Schultz'  procedure a multiple regression was computed
for data in the United  States for the years  1935-51  excluding the
years  1943,  1944,  and  1945.  These  years  were  excluded  on  the
grounds that per capita utilization was  unusually high as  a result
of  subsidized  feeding  and commercial  use  of  wheat.  The  price
series  used was  the  season  average farm  price  given  in Agricul-
tural  Statistics deflated  by  an index  of wholesale  prices,  1913=
100.  The calculated  elasticity was found  to be -. 1209,  which  is
very low. This calculation  involves  the assumption that the elas-
ticity  of  demand  is  constant  throughout  the  demand  schedule,
which is  possibly  unrealistic at lower  prices  where  wheat  would
become competitive  as  a feed grain.  Estimates on the price  elas-
ticity  of  demand  for  corn  range  from  -. 4  to  -. 5.  This means
that the demand for wheat would have a similar elasticity  at the
range  of prices  in which wheat would be substituted  for corn.
Estimates of the amount of wheat that would be carried over
under various levels of price supports are shown in Table  15. The
estimates  on  carry-over  were  calculated  on  the assumption  that
300 million bushels  could  be  sold  in  the export market.
A  system  of  flexible  price  supports  varying  inversely  with
stocks  would  retain  a  substantial  degree  of  the  price  assurance
features  of the system of rigid  support  prices but should  modify
substantially  the  quantity  of  surplus  stocks  accumulated.  The
amount  of  funds  required  for  subsidy  should  be  smaller.  The
effects of flexible supports on farm income and resource use would
be in the same direction  as the effects of rigid high-level supports,
but the degree of effect would be modified.
Flexible price  supports would not  solve all of  the wheat  sur-
plus problem.
Wheat surpluses would  be modified but not avoided.
Production  controls on wheat would  be required in some  sit-
uations but not as frequently  as with rigid supports.
Flexible  loan rates  would tend  to  stabilize  total  income  for
groups of producers as compared with income under a system
of rigid supports.
47Flexible supports varying in the opposite  direction from total
stocks would  promote  the exporting of wheat  and would  en-
courage  feeding  of wheat  to livestock.
The idea has been advanced  that stocks of all grains might be'
combined  to serve  as  a  composite  basis  for supporting  prices  of
grains.  Stocks  of wheat and  stocks of  the four feed grains might
be combined  in establishing  the basis  for  support. This idea has
not been  analyzed  adequately  to determine  the  effects  on  farm
income,  influence  on  the substitution  of wheat  and  feed  grains,
and the prospective  cost of such a program compared to the cur-
rent system of price supports.
Two-Price  Systems
Two-price  systems  have  long  been  suggested  as  solutions  to
the wheat problem.  The McNary-Haugen  plan, which was advo-
cated  in  the  twenties,  and  the  various  export  subsidy  schemes
belong  to  this category.  The  United  States  has had  a two-price
system  for wheat  during  the last  four  years.  This  program  has
cost  approximately  one-half  billion  dollars  in  export  subsidies.
A two-price  or multiple-price  system is  a form  of  price  dis-
crimination.  Price  discrimination  is a term  (used in the  simplest
sense)  applied to the practice of charging different buyers  differ-
ent  prices  for  the same  product.  Successful  price discrimination
rests upon  the  following  conditions:
1. Monopoly or collusion among sellers.  Otherwise individual
sellers  could  always  profit  by  selling  their  output  in  the
higher  priced  market.  Monopoly  implies  control  of  pro-
duction.
2. The total market  must be capable  of subdivision  into  sep-
arate markets such that reaction of buyers to price changes
varies from one market to another.
3. The cost of preventing persons who buy in the lower-priced
market from reselling in the higher-priced  market must be
less than the gain  to be  derived  from price  discrimination.
Where these conditions can  be met,  a particular  group,  such
as wheat  growers,  can  increase  the  average price  of its product
above  that which  would  prevail  in  a freely  competitive  market
and  thereby  gain  an  advantage  relative  to  other  groups  in  the
economy,  provided production  is  strictly controlled.
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resources  engaged  in  production  of  agricultural  products.  This
is considered to be an agricultural problem.  If the average price
under  a  two-price  system  were  less  than  that  received  under
present support programs with no reduction in price  uncertainty,
then such price  discrimination  would  tend to discourage  the use
of some resources in agriculture  and thereby tend to alleviate  this
problem. On the other hand, if the average price were increased
under a  two-price  system,  resources  would  be  attracted  to  agri-
culture.  This would tend to worsen  the already existing problem
unless production were strictly controlled.
A disparity  of  agricultural  producers'  incomes  compared  to
that of producers in other sectors  of the national economy is  also
considered to be a problem.  If, as stated above, the average price
under  a two-price  system  were  less  than  present support  prices,
farmers' net income would drop in the short run because  receipts
would  drop  more  rapidly  than costs.  In the  long  run,  farmers'
net income for particular  groups could be maintained  above  the
level  possible  in  a  free  market  operation  as  long  as  production
was rigidly controlled.  With  production  controls  a market  prob-
ably would spring up in production rights  (such as acreage  allot-
ments or quotas).  The value of these rights would be capitalized
into value  of land and other factors  of production.
Price discrimination  might assist in easing  the shock of lower
farm incomes that result  from temporary overproduction.  There
are,  however,  alternative  ways  of  dealing  with  this  problem,
which  might  prove  superior  to  price  discrimination.  Weather
fluctuations  are  another  agricultural  problem.
Self Regulation by  Producer Groups
Wheat  farmers have  long had  the desire for  greater  control
over the movement into market channels  and the pricing of their
commodity.  The  efforts of The United Grain  Growers  following
World War  I, the state wheat pools, and the international wheat
pool conferences  of the early thirties were  actions growing out of
this fundamental desire.  The establishment by the Federal  Farm
Board of a national sales agency for wheat known as the Farmers
National  Grain  Corporation  was  a  response  to  the  demand  on
the part of farmers to have governmental  assistance in achieving
greater  control  over  the  marketing  and  pricing  of  wheat.  In
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selling  agency  and  a  system  of  orderly  marketing  during  the
twenties  was  the outgrowth  of a similar  desire  among  Canadian
farmers.  These  unsuccessful  attempts  in  the  decade  following
World War  I raise the question whether this approach  ever can
be successful for a basic food commodity, such as wheat, produced
over wide geographical  areas and under widely divergent circum-
stances.  However,  unsuccessful  attempts  in  the  past  are not  an
indication  that  this  approach  may  not  be  attempted  again  at
some time  in the future.
Some  commodity  groups,  such  as  the citrus  fruit  producers
and walnut  growers,  have  achieved  a substantial  degree  of  con-
trol over output and price through cooperative  action or market-
ing agreements. Fluid milk producers  have influenced  prices and
quantity marketed  by collective bargaining.
Group action in the control of wheat output would be difficult
to achieve  because  of  the number  of  producers  and the  diverse
geographical  areas  involved.  In the past,  producer  groups  have
not  been  successful  in influencing  prices  for  substantial  periods
of time when large numbers and large areas were involved.  How-
ever,  Canadian  wheat  farmers  gained  substantial  control  over
the marketing  of their crop prior  to the  depression  period,  and
labor unions have been successful in maintaining collective  action
involving large numbers of individuals.
Self regulation would  give wheat  farmers the opportunity  to
decide for themselves by democratic action how much wheat they
wished to market  and the price at which it would be moved into
marketing  channels.  Such  action,  unless  supported  by  effective
state  or  federal  legislation,  would  involve  undesirable  policing
activities such as have been characteristic  of collective  bargaining
of labor and the collective bargaining of milk prices.
The  possibility  of  self regulation  is  mentioned  here  because
of fundamental  desires of farmers.  They seek a minimum of gov-
ernment  regulation  and  a maximum  of  freedom  to make  their
own decisions. They also seek equality of bargaining power in the
market place.  Cooperative  or collective  action would  give wheat
farmers  a degree  of independence  and  a feeling of status  which
will not prevail  under marketing  quotas  and  government  estab-
lished  support  prices.  Independence,  equality,  and  bargaining
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ceivable  that  they  might  be  willing  to sacrifice  some  economic
advantage  to  gain  these  goals.  This  approach,  of course,  raises
the question of monopoly  control.
The  Canadiai System of Price  Support
In the major wheat producing areas of Canada the marketing
of wheat is under government  control.  There is  only one  agency
to  which  farmers  can  sell  their  wheat.  This  is  the  Canadian
Wheat  Board  which  sets  prices  paid  to  farmers  and  prices  at
which wheat is sold on the domestic market.  The initial payment
to farmers is a conservative  estimate of what the Board considers
may  be  the  price  at which  it  will  later  resell  the  wheat.  The
amount of the forthcoming initial payment is announced prior to
seeding time. This is a guaranteed minimum.
If the price at which the Board resells the wheat turns out to
be greater than estimated or if the estimate was too conservative,
and returns accrue to the Wheat Board, these returns may be dis-
tributed subsequently  to farmers  as participating  payments.
Export  prices  obviously  cannot  be  dictated  by  the  Wheat
Board.  With the  exception  of  International  Wheat  Agreement
commitments,  export wheat is sold at prevailing  world prices.
In Canada there is no direct control of acreage seeded.  Farm-
ers are free to plant as much or  as little as they please.  There is
no provision in the current legislation for acreage  control. How-
ever,  in  1941  and  1942  such  controls  were  in effect.  There  are
controls on the marketing of wheat. Farmers market their wheat
under a delivery quota system which is based  upon seeded  acre-
age.  Ordinarily  the first delivery quota for a given crop is  about
five  bushels  per  seeded  acre.  Later  deliveries  are geared  to  the
availability  of storage  and  transportation.  Farmers  are  respon-
sible  for the maintenance  of quality  as  long  as  the wheat  is  on
the farm.  No payments  are  received  by farmers until delivery  is
made,  and  delivery  cannot  be  made  until  authorized  by  the
Wheat Board.
Grain marketing facilities are owned and operated by private
and cooperative  interests.  However,  margins for handling  grain
are fixed by the Board so that dealers are in effect little more than
government agents.
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Board for  the initial payment  and to a certain extent  on the dis-
cretion  of  government  for participating  payments.  Farmers  are
never  entirely  sure  about  the  final  price  until  long  after  they
have  disposed  of  their  wheat.  In  some  instances  participating
payments  have been made retroactive  for several  years.  A possi-
bility  exists  that  timely  distribution  of  these  payments  may  be
used to exert political  influence  on wheat farmers.
It might  be  noted  that in  comparison  to free  market  oper-
ations  the  Canadian  marketing  program  is  under  almost  com-
plete  governmental  control.  There  are  conflicting  reports  on
the  program's  reception  in  Canada.  Unofficially,  it  is  reported
that  the  private  grain  trade  is  almost  unanimously  opposed  to
the program. On the same basis it is reported that many farmers
approve and  endorse  it.
In comparing  the Canadian program with that of the United
States,  it appears that  attention should be directed  to the differ-
ence  in  objectives  of  the  two  programs.  The  major  objective
in  Canada  apparently  is  to  "stabilize  the  market."  There  is  no
explicit  reference  to  parity or redistribution  of national  income
in  favor  of  agriculture.  In  the  United  States  the  objectives
include  both  stability  of  income  and  a  concept  of  establishing
farm  income  on  a  parity  with  other  segments  of  the  economy.
Even if it were granted that the centralized  program is work-
ing with a reasonable degree of satisfaction in Canada, that would
not  necessarily  insure  an  equal  degree  of  success  in the  United
States.  Unless  the  objectives  or goals were  the  same  and  unless
United  States citizens held value judgments regarding  the order-
ing  or  weighing  of  goals  that  were  similar  to  those  held  by
Canadians,  there would  be  no  assurance  of similar  results.  Fur-
thermore,  the relative importance  of the agricultural sector to the
total national  economy  is  substantially  different  in Canada  than
it is  in  the  United  States.  In  Canada,  agriculture  is  relatively
more  important  than the  industrial sector.  Under  such  circum-
stances,  even  though  incomes  in  the  industrial  sector  might  be
greater  than  in  agriculture,  an  attempt  to  obtain  parity  by
subsidizing agriculture  from public funds would to a large extent
be  asking  agriculture  to  lift itself  by  its  own  boot  straps.  The
base of the industrial sector from which agriculture  might be sub-
sidized simply is too small to be effective.  This also is tied up with
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extent  by  export  prices.  This  means  that  the  well-being  of
Canadian  wheat  farmers  is determined  largely  by world  wheat
prices  and  the  remainder  of  the  Canadian  economy  is  not  of
sufficient  relative  importance  to  carry  agriculture,  so  to  speak.
This is not true to the same extent in the United States,  although
in  principle  the  situation  is  similar  and  eventually  the  same
forces  might prevail.
The  Canadian  program  is  primarily  a  pricing  and market-
ing  system to assist  Canadian  farmers  to  move their  production
into the world  market  in an orderly  manner  at stable  prices.  It
is  doubtful  if  United  States  wheat  producers  would  be  willing
to  accept  a  price  which  would  permit  our  surplus  production
to  move  into  the  world  market  without  subsidy.
In examining governmental  programs  to assist farmers,  men-
tion  should  be  made  of  the  British  agricultural  program.  The
British  program  was  improvised  piecemeal  to  meet  specific
emergencies  but an  attempt  was  made  in  the  Agricultural  Act
of  1947 to  systematize  the plan into a coordinated  scheme.  Two
primary  features  of  the  program  are  guaranteed  fixed  prices
and  various  forms  of  direct  and  indirect  subsidies.
The  objective  of  the  program  is  to  establish  stability  of
net farm income for British agriculture  as a whole. The Act does
not specify the level at which net income is to be stabilized.  How-
ever,  the government's  policy  is  stated to be the promotion  of  a
"stable  and  efficient  agricultural  industry  capable  of  producing
such part of the nation's  food  and other  agricultural  produce  as
in the  national  interest  it is  desirable  to  produce  in  the  United
Kingdom, and of producing it at minimum prices consistent with
proper remuneration  and living conditions for farmers and work-
ers  in agriculture  and  an adequate  return on  capital invested in
the industry."
The  Act  provides  that the  government  fix  prices  for  stated
periods  ahead  for  all  the  main  farm  products.  Some  are  an-
nounced  for as much as four years  in advance.  These  prices are
reviewed  once  a year.  Thus, prices are  fixed for the year  imme-
diately  following  the  review.  Guaranteed  prices  beyond  the im-
mediate  year  are  in effect  minimum  prices.  Subsequent  reviews
may  increase  them.  In  a  few  cases  maximum  prices  are  also
announced. In the case of wheat,  prices are fixed in February for
53the  crop  to  be  harvested  the  year  following  that  in  which  the
review  is  held.
Before  determining  the  annual  price  schedules  the  govern-
ment is under obligation  to consider,  in consultation  with repre-
sentatives  of  the farmers,  "the  general  economic  conditions  and
prospects  of the agricultural  industry."  In effect,  the outcome  is
a negotiated  price.  However,  the ultimate  price  is  the responsi-
bility of the government  alone and it is not essential  that the  re-
view  should  result  in agreed  prices.  Nevertheless,  great  impor-
tance  is attached  to these consultations  between  the government
and  farmers'  representatives.
The  British  system was  designed  to  give  producers  not  only
a guaranteed  fixed price but an assured market  for their output
at that  price.  This  is  accomplished  through  a  system  of  central
purchase  by the government  either directly  (as for  livestock)  or
through accredited  agents  (as for  cereals, sugar beets, milk,  and
eggs). The Act of  1947  provides the right to fix quantitive limits
but so far this has not been used.  Thus,  there are  no  direct  pro-
duction controls. The price mechanism is used by the government
to direct the use of resources into what is believed to be  the most
desirable  uses  from  the  standpoint of  national  economy.
Forward  Prices
Forward  pricing is a system of pricing that might be adapted
to  wheat.  Forward  prices  are  employed  in  the  British  agricul-
tural  program.  Wheat  is  a  commodity  that  has  characterstics
of  production  and  use  which  lend  themselves  to  a  specified  or
guaranteed  price  for  given  production  periods.  As  indicated
earlier,  one  of the major  problems of  the wheat  industry  is  the
large  fluctuation  in  price  from  season  to  season  resulting  from
variations in natural influences, such as weather. Forward pricing
would  reduce  price  uncertainty  to wheat  farmers  by  improving
estimates  of demand.  Guaranteed prices  for a production  period
would  reduce  price  uncertainty  for  wheat  farmers  by  trans-
ferring  responsibility  for  market  demand  from  wheat  farmers
to consumers of flour and cereal products. This method of pricing
would  reduce  the  effects  of  fluctuations  in  production  (from
surplus  to  shortages)  and  would  improve  the  welfare  of  con-
sumers by giving them protection from shortages  and high prices.
This  would  be  accomplished  by  charging  deficiency  payments
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It can be argued that the cost transferred to consumers of wheat
is a type  of insurance  premium  against shortages  and attendant
high  prices.  To operate  effectively  a system  of  forward  pricing
would  need to be  accompanied  by  a storage  program  or  a  pro-
gram  of  adequate  reserve  stocks.  The  physical  characteristics
of  wheat  lend  themselves  to  storage  and  economical  trans-
portation.
Forward  pricing would  provide  opportunity  to  continue  the
freedom  of individual farmers to own and control  resources used
in  the  production  of wheat.  A  board  of  competent  technicians
having  access  to  information  on  utilization,  export  outlets,  and
production  costs  and techniques  in various areas  should  be  able
to  set  forward  prices  which  would  result  in  fewer  mistakes  in
adjusting  production  to utilization  than  have characterized  the
free market  as  a mechanism for controlling resources  applied to
wheat production.
Forward  pricing would not  cure  all  the economic  ills  of the
wheat  industry.  The system  would not compensate  for  extremes
of  weather or unemployment.  There could  be political  pressure
on  the price  setting board,  and there  would be error in the pre-
dicted  prices.
Socialized  Wheat Production
The traditional  approach for pricing of farm commodities  in
the United  States  has  been  the  free  market  operating  through
competitive  prices. At the other end of the range  of possibilities
is  centralized  planning  with all  production,  pricing,  and use  de-
cisions  being  vested  in  a  central  board  or  commission  having
authority to say how much should be produced,  who should pro-
duce,  and  the price  at  which  the  product  should  be  delivered.
Use  of  this  system  in  varying  degree  has  been  attempted  by
totalitarian  countries.  Experiences  of Germany and Italy in pro-
viding food for  their populations and the  current food  situation
in the once productive agricultural regions  of eastern Europe  in-
dicate that this system  is not effective  for  a substantial  period of
time.  The basic  economic  institutions  of  private  property,  free-
dom of  contract,  and personal  liberty  plus  the traditional  inde-
pendence  and the democratic  philosophy of this country indicate
that such a system  would have  little  acceptance  or effectiveness
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in wheat and  the need  for food in other areas  of the world  sug-
gest  centralized  planning  as  a possible  approach.
CONCLUDING  APPRAISAL
When  attempting  a  summary  appraisal  of  suggested  or
possible schemes  for implementing  price policy  for  a commodity
such  as  wheat,  one  is  confronted  with  conflict  or  inconsisten-
cies among  the general economic  goals  and the specific  goals  of
agricultural  policy.  If  primary  consideration  is  given  to  con-
sumer sovereignty,  freedom of resource  ownership, and  efficiency
of resource  use,  the traditional approach of the free market with
competitive  prices  has  first  priority.  On  the  other  hand,  if
economic  security  and  protection  of farmers'  incomes  from  low
prices and  monopoly  influence  are  given  primary  consideration,
rigid  high-level  supports  appear  to  give  the  best  prospect  of
achieving  these  goals. The  ranking or priority given  to the vari-
ous  means  is  determined  primarily  by  the relative  emphasis  or
importance  given  to economic  goals.
In  the  choice  of  means,  considerations  other  than  those  of
economic  goals  also  enter  the  picture.  Political  feasibility,  con-
sumer  reaction,  and  financial  cost  to  taxpayers  are  important
considerations.  Considering  the political  strength  of agriculture,
the political influence of wheat farmers, the importance of wheat
in  the  economy  of  the  country,  and  the  importance  of  wheat
in terms of defense  and  political  strategy,  it is  assumed  that the
wheat  industry  will  continue  to  receive  consideration  as  price
policies  and programs  are  modified  or  replaced.  On  the  other
hand,  when  consideration  is  directed  to  the  magnitude  of  the
wheat  surplus  problem,  the  relatively  minor  progress  toward
achieving  real  solutions,  and  financial  costs  to  taxpayers,  it  is
questionable  if transfers  of  income  comparable  to  those  of  the
last  four  years  will  continue  to  be  approved  for  the  wheat
industry. There  is reason  to believe that the substantial  transfers
of income  to wheat  farmers  through subsidies  from  the treasury
during the last ten  years  of excellent  yield and  full employment
may  have  jeopardized  the farmer's  position with  taxpayers  and
consumers.  There  may  be subsequent  periods  of  low yields  and
low prices similar to those of the thirties when the good will and
assistance  of taxpayers  and  consumers  generally  will be needed
more  urgently  than  during  recent  years.
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goals,  such  as  freedom  of  resource  ownership  and  efficiency  of
resource  use,  with  other  goals,  such  as  economic  security  and
price assurance,  and if possible  programs  are appraised  in terms
of  political  feasibility  and  taxpayer  tolerance,  it  appears  that
some modification  of the existing  scheme  of price  supports, such
as  flexible  supports,  are  probable.  The  high degree  of inelastic-
ity of demand  for  wheat,  the large  quantities of resources  avail-
able  for  wheat  production,  the  recent  response  of  acreage  to
increases  in  prices,  and  the  price  uncertainty  characteristic  of
the  competitive  market  appear  to  rule  out  a  return to  the  free
market for wheat which prevailed prior to the depression  period.
On the other  hand,  emphasis  upon  freedom  of  decision,  de-
mocracy  in  political  actions,  and  the  traditional  independence
of farmers appear to preclude the development  of any program of
highly regimented  actions such  as  centralized  planning,  or  even
programs similar or comparable  to the Canadian or British plans.
A  two-price  or  multiple-price  system  falls  within  the  realm  of
political  feasibility  and  taxpayer  tolerance,  but  economic  anal-
ysis  of such schemes  leaves much to be  desired in terms of  long-
run contributions to real solution of basic problems.  In the longer
run as a possible successor  to a system of flexible prices,  a scheme
of forward pricing offers substantial possibilities. Forward  pricing
has  some  of the  advantages,  in terms  of stability  of income  and
price  assurance,  characteristic  of  the  system  of  pricing  of  the
products  of  industry  and  the  system  of  wage  determination.  At
the same time it provides opportunity for flexibility of adjustment
from  season  to  season  to  take  into  account  the  variability  of
yield  resulting  from  natural  influences  and  the  variability  in
utilization  arising  from  fluctuations  in  nonfood  uses  of  wheat.
Modifications  over  time  or changing  emphasis  on  economic
goals  may  reduce  the  inconsistency  or  conflicts  in  goals.  This
may make  it  easier  to develop and plan  action programs  in the
future.  The  current  generation  of  citizens  apparently  gives  less
emphasis  or  priority  to  freedom  of  ownership  and  resource
use and  relatively more emphasis  to economic  security and price
assurance  than  did  the  generation  of  our  fathers  and  grand-
fathers. This indicates that understanding and acceptance  of basic
goals  may make  it easier  to determine  the  means  or method  of
implementing  goals in the future.
57In an opening paragraph  of this paper, it was recognized  that
actions  implementing  agricultural  policy  may  be  designated
as direct price-income  programs  and general  programs  affecting
use  of  resources.  When  consideration  is  given  to  the  long-run
interests  of agriculture  and the social  welfare,  one  may  contend
that  an  undue  emphasis  has  been  given  to  price  policy  during
the  last  twenty  years  with  relatively  insufficient  emphasis  and
consideration  to  programs  relating  to  resource  use.  When  the
contribution  of  agricultural  research  and  agricultural  educa-
tion,  including  the  efforts  of  extension  workers,  is  considered,
one  is  inclined  to  conclude  that  more  long-run  benefits  might
have been obtained for agriculture if a portion of the half billion
dollars  used  to  subsidize  exports  of  wheat  had  been  directed
toward  expansion  of fundamental  research  and adult education.
This is  not  intended  to minimize  past  accomplishments.  Rather
it is a tribute to scientists  and educators who have contributed  to
the sound and  efficient  use  of agricultural  resources  in America.
It  is  through  these  means  rather  than through  direct  financial
assistance that real improvement in the welfare of wheat farmers
is to be achieved. The real solution to the wheat surplus problem
lies in this direction.  This road  is  long  and progress  may  not be
spectacular.
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00TABLE  2.  WHEAT:  SEEDED  ACREAGE  IN  SPECIFIED  WHEAT  GROWING
REGIONS,  UNITED  STATES,  1919-53
Region



























































































































































































1Kansas,  Oklahoma,  Texas, Nebraska,  and Colorado.
2North Dakota, Montana,  South Dakota, and Minnesota.
30hio, Missouri,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Pennsylvania,  North  Carolina,  Virginia, Kentucky,
Tennessee,  Maryland,  South Carolina,  Georgia,  and  West Virginia.
4Washington,  Oregon,  and Idaho.
5Preliminary.
6December  1952  winter estimate  and March  1953 spring prospective plantings.
Source:  Wheat  Situation,  USDA, Bureau  of Agricultural  Economics.
60TABLE  3.  WHEAT:  SUPPLY  AND  DISTRIBUTION  IN
CONTINENTAL  UNITED  STATES,  1909-53
Total  Total Do-  Net Year  Stocks  New  Total  Total  Do-  Net  Stocks
Beginning  1  Crop  Domestic  mestic  Dis-
July  Supply  appearance

























































































































































































































































































































1Stocks  1909-22  partly estimated  to  include same positions as currently  reported.
2Includes products in terms of wheat and includes  shipments to territories of the  United
States,  which currently  total about  4 million bushels.
3Net imports.
41909-36,  some  new wheat  included  in commercial  and merchant mill  stocks;  1937  to
date,  only old crop  is shown in all stocks positions.
5Preliminary.
Source:  Wheat  Situation,  USDA, Bureau  of Agricultural  Economics.
61TABLE  4.  PERCENTAGE  OF  WHEAT  ACREAGE  ABANDONMENT,
MAJOR  REGIONS,  1919-52
Hard  Soft  Pacific












































































































































































62TABLE  5.  FREQUENCY  DISTRIBUTION  OF  PERCENTAGE  OF  WHEAT  ACREAGE
ABANDONED,  MAJOR  WHEAT  REGIONS,  UNITED  STATES,  1919-52
Region
Percentage  of  Re
Abandonment  Hard  Soft  Pacific
Winter  Winter  Spring  Northwest
Number of rears
0-  4  2  11  14  8
5-  9  11  19  11  14
10-14  4  3  1  5
15-19  6  2  5
20-24  3  2
25-29  3  1  1
30-34  2  1  1
35-39  1




60 and more  1
Total  34  34  34  34
TABLE  6.  COEFFICIENTS  OF  CORRELATION  AS  CALCULATED  FOR  THE
FOUR  MAJOR  WHEAT  PRODUCING  REGIONS
Region  r  Degree of Significance  of r
l
Hard Red Winter  +.75  Highly significant,  i.e.,  1%  level
Pacific Northwest  +.73  Highly significant,  i.e.,  1% level
Spring  +.59  Significant,  i.e.,  5%  level
Soft Red Winter  -. 13  Nonsignificant
1The  degree  of significance  is  based upon probability  estimates.  Its  meaning may  be
expressed  as follows,  using the coefficient  of correlation  of the  hard red winter area as an
example:  If there  actually  is  no relationship  between  two  variates  of  a population,  the
chances  of getting a sample  r as  large as  .75  (with 15  degrees  of freedom)  are  less than
one  in one  hundred.  Therefore, it  may be concluded  that there is a relationship  between
the variates  in question.
No  adjustments  have  been  made  for  possible  effects  of  trend.  The  calculations  were
based on data for  years,  1936  to 1951.  It  is  likely that trend effect  in that period would
be negligible  as  the wheat  industry  was  well established  and no major  innovations  were
introduced.
TABLE  7.  MEAN  AND  STANDARD  DEVIATION,  YIELD  PER  SEEDED  ACRE,
MAJOR  WHEAT  REGIONS,  UNITED  STATES,  1938-53
Region
Hard  Red  Soft Red  Pacific
Winter  Winter  Spring  Northwest
Bushels per Acre
Mean  12.7  18.2  14.4  24.7
Standard
deviation  3.3  2.5  3.6  2.3
63TABLE  8.  INCOME  (VALUE  OF  PRODUCTION)  FROM  WHEAT,
HARD  RED  WINTER  WHEAT  REGION  (KANSAS,  OKLAHOMA,







































































1Deflated by index of prices paid by farmers,  interest,  taxes, and wages,  1910-14=100.
Source:  1920-44,  Wheat  Production,  Farm  Disposition  and  Value,  1904-44,  USDA,
Bureau  of Agricultural  Economics,  March  1948;  1945-51,  Agricultural  Statistics,  USDA
(production  times average  season's  price received  by farmers);  1952,  calculated.TABLE  9.  INCOME  (VALUE  OF  PRODUCTION)  FROM  WHEAT,
OHIO,  INDIANA,  AND  ILLINOIS,  1920-52
Deflated
1 Income
For Crop of:  Total  of







































































































































































1Deflated by index of prices  paid by farmers,  interest,  taxes, and wages,  1910-14=100.
Source:  1920-44,  Wheat  Production,  Farm  Disposition  and  Value,  1904-44,  USDA,
Bureau  of Agricultural  Economics,  March  1948;  1945-51,  Agricultural  Statistics,  USDA
(production  times  average  season's  price received  by farmers);  1952,  calculated.
TABLE  10.  AVERAGE  HOURS  OF  LABOR  USED  PER  ACRE,  AND  PER  UNIT  OF
PRODUCTION  AND YIELD  PER ACRE OF WHEAT  FOR SELECTED  PERIODS,  1910-48
1910-14  1925-29  1935-39  1940-44  1945-48
Man-hours per  acre  15  11  9  7  6
Yield,  bushels  14.4  14.1  13.2  17.1  17.7
Man-hours per  100
bushels  106  74  67  43  34
65TABLE  11.  WHEAT:  ANNUAL  AVERAGE  PRICE  PER  BUSHEL
Year  Received by  No.  2 Hard  No. 2
Beginning  Farmers  Winter  Red
July  United  States  Kansas  City  St.  Louis
Cents
1909  98.6  107.0  113
1910  90.6  98.0  99
1911  86.5  97.0  94
1912  79.8  88.0  105
1913  78.9  84.0  89
1914  97.1  105.0  110
1915  95.6  119.0  120
1916  143.0  171.0  163
1917  204.0  252.0  223
1918  205.0  219.0  223
1919  216.0  242.0  230
1920  182.0  183.1  213
1921  103.0  119.6  127
1922  96.1  112.6  121
1923  92.3  104.9  107
1924  124.0  135.4  159
1925  143.0  162.7  169
1926  121.0  135.3  138
1927  118.0  135.1  149
1928  98.8  112.4  139
1929  103.0  119.6  130
1930  66.3  75.5  83
1931  38.2  46.9  52
1932  37.5  50.9  55
1933  73.6  88.5  94
1934  83.9  98.1  94
1935  82.7  105.1  95
1936  102.0  121.4  111
1937  95.9  110.8  113
1938  55.6  69.5  70
1939  68.6  74.1  75
1940  67.4  81.9  82
1941  93.9  112.0  110
1942  109.0  126.3  134
1943  135.0  144.8  167
1944  141.0  155.6  158
1945  149.0  160.2  168
1946  190.0  208.8  216
1947  229.0  252.1  245
1948  198.0  218.8  219
1949  188.0  216.0  191
1950  200.0  228.0  220
1951  211.0  243.0  223
Source:  Wheat  Situation,  USDA,  Bureau  of  Agricultural  Economics,  July-August
1950,  January-February  1950,  and  January-February-March  1953,  and  Agricultural
Statistics,  USDA,  1942 and  1952.
66TABLE  12.  PER  CAPITA  CIVILIAN  CONSUMPTION  OF  WHEAT
FLOUR  AND  CEREAL,  UNITED  STATES
Year

































































































































Source:  Agricultural  Statistics,  USDA.
67TABLE  13.  WHEAT  PROCESSED  FOR  FOOD,  DOMESTIC  DISAPPEARANCE,
AND  NET  EXPORTS,  UNITED  STATES
Year  Processed  Total
Beginning  for  Domestic  Expo
July  Food  Disappearance  Exports
Millions of Bushels
1909  538  91
1910  537  73
1911  552  81
1912  568  147
1913  612  149
1914  607  338
1915  609  242
1916  596  184
1917  555  105
1918  580  279
1919  647  220
1920  574  315
1921  579  268
1922  603  208
1923  620  134
1924  613  258
1925  584  96
1926  611  209
1927  677  194
1928  656  144
1929  622  138
1930  500  759  106
1931  498  760  120
1932  508  722  31
1933  465  633  24
1934  475  659  - 62
1935  484  661  -272
1936  489  689  -222
1937  485  701  103
1938  496  713  110
1939  490  663  48
1940  492  676  34
1941  473  668  28
1942  500  949  32
1943  482  1,237  -91 2
1944  472  992  106
1945  473  894  393
1946  483  767  401
1947  488  757  490
1948  479  678  506
1949  484  679  301
1950  482  690  358
1951  481  673  448
1952  6693  298
1953  6863
lIncludes products in terms of wheat and includes shipments to territories of the United
States, which  currently total about  4 million  bushels.
2Net  imports.
SPreliminary.
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